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WorldSummary. — We examine the allocation of net loans, net transfers, and grants to IDA countries over the period 1982–2008 focusing on
the role of debt and debt sustainability in the decisions of multilateral and bilateral donors. We find no evidence of defensive lending but
strong evidence of defensive granting. A significant negative reaction of net loans to the debt ratio indeed characterizes the decisions of
both multilateral and bilateral creditors. The impact of lower loans on the budget of debtor countries is however accommodated through
higher grants, in addition to debt relief. These findings are consistent with a substitution of grants for loans and with the new approach
to debt sustainability but question the efficiency and selectivity of foreign aid.
 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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Over the last 20 years geopolitical and global economic
changes have modified the way official aid is provided. 1 The
so-called “new rhetoric on aid” has emphasized the impor-
tance of increasing aid flows to achieve the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals and promoting a greater selectivity among
donors while encouraging recipient countries’ ownership of
development programs 2 (e.g., see the 2005 Paris Declaration
on aid effectiveness). Furthermore, debt relief initiatives, such
as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and
the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), have become a
cornerstone of this new strategy since a consensus view has
emerged that poor countries’ debt write-offs are a precondition
for a more effective aid policy.
Berthe`lemy and Tichit (2004), Roodman (2005), Dollar and
Levin (2006), Easterly (2007), Claessens, Cassimon, and Van
Campenhout (2009) have all examined the issue of selectivity
in aid allocation showing that in recent years donors have be-
come more selective with respect to poverty and/or institu-
tional factors. The high debt of low income countries,
besides geopolitical motivations, is one of the reasons that
may explain the past allocation of foreign aid. In particular,
it can be argued that, in the past, loans and grants were direc-
ted to highly indebted countries with the aim to avoid their de-
fault. The role of debt in explaining a nonselective pattern of
aid flows has been scantly investigated in the literature on
aid selectivity, and informally discussed in the literature on
defensive lending (Bird & Milne, 2003; Birdsall, Claessens, &
Diwan, 2003; Cohen, Jacquet, & Reisen, 2007; Easterly,
2002; Lerrick, 2005). In this paper we explicitly examine the
role of debt (and its ownership) in affecting official donors’
decisions on allocating aid to low income countries.
Relying on Bohn’s (1998) model of intertemporal debt sus-
tainability, we first derive theoretical implications for net loans
and net transfers (net of debt service) in relation to external
debt that imply no-Ponzi scheme financing and trade-deficit
correction, respectively. We show that a negative reaction of
net loans to the debt ratio is a sufficient condition for a sus-
tainable (no-Ponzi) debt strategy, whereas positive or no reac-
tion would be evidence of defensive lending. Furthermore,
since net transfers should decrease with the debt ratio to force
a correction of the trade deficit (or greater FDI inflows), the1
cite this article in press as: Marchesi, S., & Missale, A. DidHi
Development (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012relation between net transfers and debt allows us to investigate
whether debtor countries’ policies were “constrained” by for-
eign aid. Further insight is obtained by studying the allocation
of grants excluding debt relief. A positive reaction of conven-
tional grants to the debt ratio together with a reduction of net
loans suggests that grants, in addition to debt relief, were given
to ease the debt reduction process in highly indebted countries.
We call this strategy “defensive granting,” for lack of a better
term.
We estimate separate dynamic models of the allocation of
net loans, grants, and net transfers with panel data for 75
International Development Association (IDA) and IDA-
Blend countries (hereafter IDA countries) over the period
from 1982 to 2008, using both fixed-effects GLS and difference
GMM estimators. 3
We find no evidence of defensive lending. Indeed, a signifi-
cant negative reaction of net loans to the debt ratio character-
izes the decisions of both multilateral and bilateral creditors.
Furthermore, each creditor group shows a stronger reaction
to the debt share it holds than to the share of debt held by
the other group. This finding is consistent with the creditors’
aim to reduce loans where they were more exposed, which is
in contrast with a defensive strategy. On the other hand, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that net transfers were insensitive
to the debt ratio. This suggests that the impact of lower loans
on the budget of debtor countries was accommodated through
the transfers of other resources that allowed these countries to
avoid a correction of their trade deficits as the debt increased.
Official donors substituted grants for loans leaving net trans-
fers to IDA countries unaffected by their relative indebtedness.and Warwick. Final revision accepted: December 4, 2012.
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12 January 2013Indeed, we find that multilateral and bilateral grants signifi-
cantly increase with the debt ratio. Conventional grants were
provided, in addition to debt relief, to mitigate the impact of
lower allocations of loans and to ease the debt adjustment pro-
cess, a strategy that we define as defensive granting.
We also allow the effect of debt on the allocation of net
loans, transfers, and grants to be different in the case of HIPC
and nonHIPC countries by dividing our sample into a group
of 40 HIPC countries and a control group of 35 nonHIPC
countries. We still find no evidence of defensive lending but
further support for the hypothesis of defensive granting.
Although the substitution of grants for loans is an established
trend of development assistance, the fact that this substitution
is conditional on high levels of debt points to a distortion of
aid flows in favor of indebted countries and questions the effi-
ciency and selectivity of foreign aid.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
briefly discusses the related literature. Section 3 presents our
definition of defensive lending and defensive granting. Section
4 develops the empirical framework. The estimation results are
presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
2122. RELATED LITERATURE
This paper is related to two strands of literature. The first is
the literature on aid allocation and selectivity. An important
finding of this literature is that aid is more effective in good
policy and institutional environments (see, e.g., Burnside &
Dollar, 2000; Chauvet, 2002; Chauvet & Guillamont, 2001;
Svensson, 1999; World Bank, 1998). Although the robustness
of some results has been questioned (see, e.g., Easterly, Levine,
& Roodman, 2004; Rajan & Subramanian, 2008), the principle
that aid should be targeted to “deserving” countries is now
well established. In many cases, however, geopolitical consid-
erations played a significant role in donors’ decisions (see, e.g.,
Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Alesina & Weder, 2002; Dreher,
Sturm, & Vreeland, 2009a, Dreher, Sturm, & Vreeland,
2009b; Kuziemko & Werker, 2006). 4
As the efficiency and effectiveness of aid have gained increas-
ing attention, quite a few papers on aid allocation have explic-
itly analyzed whether donor selectivity has changed
throughout the years. Berthe`lemy and Tichit (2004), Roodman
(2005), Dollar and Levin (2006) show that donors have be-
come more selective with respect to country needs and policies
over time. 5 Focusing on bilateral aid, Claessens et al. (2009)
find that after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, and especially
in the late 1990s, bilateral aid responded more to poverty and
to the quality of policies and institutions of recipient countries.
They also consider the present value of debt as one of the vari-
ables accounting for a nonselective behavior and show that the
sensitivity of aid to the debt burden has declined over time.
But how could aid and debt be connected? 6 In principle, the
relation could go two ways. On the one hand, aid could be
negatively related to debt. This would be the case if donors re-
duced their loans as the debt increased, pulling out of highly
indebted countries in order to contain their exposure to de-
fault risk. The overall effect on aid would however depend
on grants, as the latter could either remain unchanged or be
substituted for loans in order to ease the debt adjustment pro-
cess. On the other hand, the relation between aid and debt
could be positive. This would be the case if donors extended
new loans to enable the borrowers to meet their debt service
obligations and avoid default, a practice that has been named
defensive lending. Grants could also be used to free resources
in the recipients’ budget to service the debt. Therefore, the sec-Please cite this article in press as: Marchesi, S., & Missale, A. DidHi
World Development (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012ond stream of literature to which we relate is primarily con-
cerned with defensive lending and defensive granting.
The idea of defensive lending was first suggested by Easterly
(2002). As he puts it, the central paradox of the HIPCs is that
they became indebted after two decades of partial debt relief
and concessional (official) lending. Official lenders did not
seem to follow the same prudential rules as private capital
which pulled out of HIPCs, and they may have given new
loans to actually enable the old loans to be paid back. Despite
popularity, however, the defensive lending hypothesis has re-
ceived scant attention in the empirical literature on the deter-
minants of aid flows. Bird and Milne (2003) find evidence of a
positive correlation between external debt and aid (loans plus
grants). Most contributions focus on the relationship between
gross loan disbursements and total debt service, that is, the
sum of interest and principal payments. Lerrick (2005) and
Ratha (2005) find a positive correlation between new loans
and total debt service. Cohen et al. (2007) show that this cor-
relation is stronger in the case of multilateral loans than for
bilateral and private loans. Geginat and Kraay (2007) also find
a strong correlation between IDA loans and service payments
on outstanding IDA debt, but provide several arguments as to
why this correlation should not be interpreted as evidence of
defensive lending.
Birdsall et al. (2003) investigate whether high debt levels
were a main determinant of net resource flows to Sub-Saharan
African countries over the period 1978–98. Unlike other stud-
ies, Birdsall et al. consider loans net of interest and principal
payments and, realizing that grants can be used to free re-
sources in the recipients’ budgets to service the debt, they fo-
cus on net transfers, that is, on the sum of grants and net
loans. They find that net transfers were higher in poorer coun-
tries but that the quality of their economic policy mattered lit-
tle in explaining net transfers. Indeed, donors, especially
bilaterals, made greater transfers to countries with high multi-
lateral debt, despite their bad policies. Finally, Devarajan,
Rajkumar, and Swaroop (1999) provide evidence that 30%
of aid in the period 1975–99 has been used to service the exter-
nal debt.
Our paper’s contribution is then twofold. First, drawing on
the analogy between defensive lending and Ponzi finance, we
derive a theoretical implication for the relation between net
loans and debt that allows us to overcome an important prob-
lem in the investigation of defensive lending: the lack of a the-
oretical prediction that can be tested empirically. Second, we
contribute to the empirical literature as follows. We focus on
IDA countries, which are a homogeneous group with respect
to borrowing conditions, and distinguish between HIPC and
nonHIPC countries. We provide evidence for net loans and
grants separately, and discuss how the substitution of grants
for loans can be related to the high debt of IDA countries. Fi-
nally, the use of a dynamic panel model is new and allows us
to reach more robust conclusions.3. A MODEL-BASED TEST OF DEFENSIVE LENDING
AND DEFENSIVE GRANTING
A key problem in investigating whether defensive lending
has motivated aid flows to highly indebted countries is the lack
of a theoretical definition that can be tested empirically.
Defensive lending is usually defined as the practice of extend-
ing new loans to enable the borrower to meet his debt service
obligations and avoid default. 7
The practice of providing new loans to finance interest and
principal payments is consistent with the idea of creditorsgh Debts Distort Loan and Grant Allocation to IDA Countries?,
.12.011
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12 January 2013allowing debtor countries to run a Ponzi scheme. This suggests
that, if defensive lending ever occurred, it would have put the
debt on a divergent path thus violating intertemporal sol-
vency. A formal test of intertemporal debt sustainability can
then shed light on creditors’ behavior, as to whether they pro-
vided new loans to service debt obligations or reacted in a sys-
tematic way to prevent IDA countries’ debt from getting on an
unsustainable path. Although intertemporal solvency can be
viewed as a weak criterion of debt sustainability compared
to the requirement that the debt does not exceed specific ratios
of GDP or exports, examining whether the dynamics of the
debt satisfied an intertemporal budget constraint is informa-
tive on whether lenders forced a correction of debtor coun-
tries’ policies or softened their budget constraints.
The model-based approach to debt sustainability proposed
by Bohn (1998, 2008) provides a rigorous and intuitive test
of intertemporal sustainability that can be applied to external
debt. Bohn (1998) proved that in a regression of the primary
surplus against public debt (and other controls) a positive
coefficient on debt is a sufficient condition for the intertempo-
ral budget constraint to hold. The intuition, as further ex-
plained below, is that a positive systematic reaction of the
primary surplus–GDP ratio to the debt–GDP ratio introduces
an error correction mechanism in the dynamics of the debt
that ensures its sustainability in the long run.
The model-based sustainability approach can be applied to
external debt as follows. The external-debt-accumulation
equation is equal to
Btþ1 ¼ ð1þ rtþ1ÞðBt þ CADtÞ ð1Þ
where the debt-to-GDP ratio in the next period, Bt+1, is given
by the debt ratio at the beginning of the current period, Bt,
plus the current account deficit (net of interest payments and
nondebt creating capital inflows), CADt, times the gross return
1 + rt+1. All variables are relative to GDP, and ð1þ rtþ1Þ ¼
ð1þ itþ1ÞY $t =Y $tþ1 is the growth and exchange-rate adjusted
return on external debt, where it+1 is the nominal interest rate
and Y $t is the nominal GDP in US dollars.
The current account deficit, excluding interest payments,
that must be financed with new debt is equal to
CADt ¼ X t  Gt  FDIt þ OTHt ð2Þ
where Xt is the trade deficit in goods and services, Gt are
grants, FDIt is the nondebt creating component of foreign di-
rect investment, and OTHt is a residual component that in-
cludes net transfers (other than grants) and net income
excluding interest payments.
As the net deficit, CADt, and the total debt service, TDSt,
that is, the sum of interest and principal payments, are funded
with new loan disbursements, LDt, the latter are equal to
LDt ¼ TDSt þ CADt ð3Þ
Net loans, Lt, defined as the difference between gross loan
disbursements and the debt service, are thus equal to the cur-
rent account deficit excluding interest payments,
Lt  LDt  TDSt = CADt, and can be substituted for the lat-
ter in Eqn. (1) to yield
Btþ1 ¼ ð1þ rtþ1ÞðBt þ LtÞ ð4Þ
Then, the sufficient condition for intertemporal sustainabil-
ity derived in Bohn (1998) for the primary deficit can be ex-
tended to net loans. If the net loans–GDP ratio, Lt, is a
negative linear function of the initial debt–GDP ratio, Bt, after
controlling for other determinants, Zt, of net loans, so that
Lt ¼ bZt þ qBt with q < 0 ð5ÞPlease cite this article in press as: Marchesi, S., & Missale, A. DidHi
World Development (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012where Zt is a bounded stochastic process, and provided that
the stream of GDP has a finite present value, then the lending
policy does not violate the no-Ponzi game condition and the
intertemporal budget constraint holds.
Hence, a model-based test of defensive lending consists of
estimating a reaction function like Eqn. (5) and testing the null
hypothesis that q P 0. Finding that q is negative and statisti-
cally significant is sufficient to guarantee that lenders did not
allow debtor countries to run a Ponzi scheme.
The intuition behind this result is that a systematic negative
reaction of net loans to the debt ratio, q < 0, makes the debt
grow asymptotically at a slower rate than rt and thus ensures
that the no-Ponzi game condition is satisfied, as can be seen
from substituting Eqn. (5) for Lt in Eqn. (4):
Btþ1 ¼ ð1þ qÞð1þ rtþ1ÞBt þ ð1þ rtþ1ÞbZt ð6Þ
The budget constraint (6) shows that the debt grows be-
tween t and t + 1 to a level that is (1 + q) of the level that im-
plies a Ponzi scheme, and n-periods ahead the debt is (1 + q)n
the size of a Ponzi scheme. If q < 0 and Zt is a bounded sto-
chastic process, then EtutþnBtþn ¼ ð1þ qÞnBtþ
Pn
i¼1ð1þ qÞni
EtV i1 ! 0 as n ! 1, where ut+n is the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between consumption in period t and t + n, and
EtVi1 is the present value of the process bZt discounted using
ut+i.
8
It is worth noting that the linear, time-invariant, negative
reaction of net loans to debt in Eqn. (5) is sufficient but not
necessary to rule out a Ponzi scheme. As Bohn (1998) shows,
intertemporal sustainability can also be ensured by a nonlinear
and/or time varying reaction insofar as the latter is strictly
negative above a certain threshold debt ratio, or the reaction
is at least negative almost surely. This suggests that, if the
hypothesis of defensive lending, q P 0, were not rejected, it
should be further investigated by introducing in Eqn. (5) non-
linear terms in the debt ratio. Nonlinearities can also be cap-
tured by separating high-debt countries from low-debt
countries. We follow this approach by distinguishing between
HIPC and nonHIPC countries in Section 5(d).
Although empirical studies of the Bohn test have mostly fo-
cused on US data, Mendoza and Ostry (2008) show how to ex-
tend the analysis to a panel of industrial and emerging
countries. In this paper we examine the lending-policy reaction
to the debt–GDP-ratio in a panel of IDA countries. Focusing
on the creditors’ reaction function rather than on debtor coun-
tries’ fiscal reactions is justified by the limited private-market
access of the IDA group over the period considered; this
makes the “fiscal space” of these countries credit-constrained
by the lending decisions of official lenders. Moreover, the lend-
ing policy of official creditors as a function of recipient coun-
tries’ characteristics is expected to be more homogeneous than
individual countries’ fiscal reactions and thus better suited for
panel model estimation.
A further advantage of estimating Eqn. (5) is that the point
estimate of the debt coefficient, q, offers (if negative) a simple
measure of the extent of the correction that can be easily com-
pared to the growth (and exchange-rate) adjusted interest rate
rt to assess the extent of debt stabilization efforts.
To gain further insight in the motivations of aid, we also
examine how grants were allocated among IDA countries. In
doing so we distinguish between two cases depending on the
evidence for net loans. Consider, first, the case of defensive
lending, that new loans were used to service the existing debt.
Then, it is unlikely that grants (other than debt forgiveness)
were given to further soften recipient countries’ budget con-
straints and thus that grants were determined by high levelsgh Debts Distort Loan and Grant Allocation to IDA Countries?,
.12.011
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12 January 2013of debt. As a result, studying the relation between grants and
the debt ratio would be of limited interest.
Suppose, instead, that a systematic negative reaction of net
loans to the level of debt, q < 0, is found in estimating equa-
tion (5). Then, it is interesting to examine whether this reduc-
tion of net loans forced a correction of debtor countries’ trade
deficits (and led to more FDI inflows) or was offset by a cor-
responding increase in grants. In fact, a reduction of net loans,
Lt = Xt  Gt  FDIt + OTHt, could either call for lower
trade deficits, Xt, and the attraction of foreign investment,
FDIt, or be accomplished through an increase in grants. This
would be the case especially if the latter freed up budget re-
sources, that is, if they were not in the form of technical coop-
eration.
To investigate whether aid was consistent with a reduction
of borrowers’ trade deficits and greater FDI attraction, we
look at net transfers, that is, the sum of net loans and grants,
NTt = Lt + Gt, as the latter are approximately equal to the
trade deficit less foreign investment, NTt = Xt  FDI-
t + OTHt. We shall examine the effect of the debt ratio on
net transfers by estimating the following equation:
NT t ¼ cZt þ kBt ð7Þ
The idea we want to explore is that intertemporal debt sus-
tainability was achieved through a substitution of grants for
loans that allowed for a looser policy adjustment. The absence
of a reaction of net transfers to the debt ratio (or a positive
one) would indicate that highly indebted countries could avoid
a correction of their trade deficits, as the debt increased, be-
cause of aid. The hypothesis of “unreactive transfers” k P 0,
can be tested by estimating Eqn. (7).
An alternative approach to Eqn. (7) is to study how the debt
ratio affected the allocation of grants by estimating the follow-
ing equation:
Gt ¼ dZt þ lBt ð8Þ
The finding of a positive effect of the debt ratio on grants, that
is, l > 0, after controlling for other country characteristics, Zt,
would point to a distortion of aid flows in favor of indebted
countries in order to ease their debt reduction process, a
hypothesis that we call defensive granting. Since debt forgive-
ness was a relevant component of total grants clearly targeted
to high-debt countries over the most recent period, the defini-
tion of grants used in the estimation of Eqns. (7) and (8) ex-
cludes debt forgiven to make sure that a positive effect of
debt on grants does not depend on debt relief.460
461
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4794. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We examine how multilateral and bilateral creditor–donors
allocated net loans, net transfers, and grants to IDA and IDA-
blend countries, focusing on the role of external debt in their
decisions.
We estimate a model of the allocation of net loans, net
transfers, and grants (taken separately) for a sample of 75
IDA and IDA-Blend countries using panel data for the period
from 1982 to 2008. We start our analysis in 1982, since the
debt crisis of the early 1980s arguably marked a shift in
regime. The sample includes 40 HIPC countries, according
to their classification in 1999, and a control group of other
35 countries (listed in Table 6 of the Appendix). 9
The empirical models are the cross-country panel versions of
Eqns. (5), (7) and (8) derived in Section 3. Using the subscript i
to index IDA country recipients and t to index time, the
estimated models arePlease cite this article in press as: Marchesi, S., & Missale, A. DidHi
World Development (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012Lit ¼ ai þ st þ bZit þ qBit þ eLit ð9Þ
NT it ¼ ai þ st þ cZit þ kBi;t þ eNTit ð10Þ
Git ¼ ai þ st þ dZit þ lBit þ eGit ð11Þ
where Lit, NTit and Git denote net loans, net transfers, and
grants, respectively, which are all measured relative to GDP.
Bit is the external debt-to-GDP ratio, and Zit is a set of explan-
atory variables capturing the other determinants of resource
allocation. Finally, ai are country-specific fixed effects, st are
yearly time dummies, and eJit denote the error terms.
10
We empirically examine the resource allocation carried out
by the two groups of multilateral and bilateral creditor–do-
nors and thus provide two estimates for each model in Eqns.
(9)–(11); one for multilateral organizations (including the
IMF) and the other for bilaterals.
Net loans, Lit, are defined as new loans minus total debt ser-
vice (i.e., interest and principal payments) and are referred to as
“net transfers on external debt” in the World Bank’s Global
Development Finance (GDF) database. Hence, net loans give
the amount of disbursements that are left to the borrowers once
they have paid for the service of their debts. It thus takes into
account the fact that a large part of new loans flows back to the
creditors in the form of interest and principal repayments.
We consider all types of loans, either concessional or non-
concessional, provided by multilateral and bilateral creditors,
since this is the relevant aggregate for the debt sustainability
analysis proposed in the previous section. As our dependent
variable includes nonconcessional loans, the present study
does not provide a formal analysis of aid allocation but natu-
rally complements the empirical literature on aid. Data on
loans come from the World Bank GDF database which re-
ports total loans unlike the OECD Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) that considers only ODA concessional
loans. Since GDF data on bilateral loans are not disaggregat-
ed by country of origin, we restrict our analysis to two groups
of creditors–donors: multilateral organizations and bilateral
creditors. We examine long-term net loans (and long-term
debt) because data on the distribution by type of creditor
are not available for short-term loans (and debt) which are,
however, a minor component of total loans.
The dependent variable “grants,” Git, is defined as total
grants minus technical cooperation and total debt forgiven.
Data on grants come from the OECD/DAC database (where
debt forgiven is classified as grant) and are disaggregated by
the type of donor: multilateral and bilateral donors. We ex-
clude debt forgiven for two reasons. First, forgiven debt is al-
ready accounted for in our definition of net loans, since it leads
to lower debt service payments in the GDF statistics (which do
not include an offsetting entry for debt relief as in the OECD/
DAC statistics). Secondly, as already discussed in Section 3,
we are interested in the effect of debt on grants in addition
to that on debt forgiveness. We also exclude technical cooper-
ation from total grants because it is the least fungible form of
aid and thus unlikely to free budget resources for debt service.
Finally, net transfers, NTit, are equal to the sum of net loans
and grants as previously defined. Hence, our definition of net
transfers measures the actual resource flows from the two
groups of multilateral and bilateral creditor–donors to indi-
vidual countries. This is consistent with “country programma-
ble aid,” a measure proposed by Do¨meland and Kharas (2009)
to capture the cash flow available to recipient countries. 11
We focus on the effect of the debt-to-GDP ratio, Bt, on donor
decisions regarding the allocation of their resources to IDA
countries. Consistently with the interpretation of Eqns. (9)–
(11) as reaction functions, we measure the debt outstanding at
the beginning of each year t with the stock of debt at the endgh Debts Distort Loan and Grant Allocation to IDA Countries?,
.12.011
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12 January 2013of the year t  1, as this is the relevant information available to
donors when deciding on resource allocation. Debt stock data
are from the GDF database and refer to long-term debt.
Recalling that a negative reaction of net loans to the debt ra-
tio, q < 0, is a sufficient condition for a sustainable (no-Ponzi)
debt strategy, the hypothesis of defensive lending can be tested
as q P 0. A nonnegative effect of the debt ratio on net transfers,
k P 0, would indicate that, because of the transfers received,
IDA countries could avoid a correction of their trade deficits
as the debt increased. The hypothesis of “unreactive transfers”
can be tested as k P 0. Finally, the reaction of grants to the debt
ratio, l, provides further insight in the policy of official donors.
Evidence of a positive effect of the debt ratio, l > 0, would sug-
gest that conventional grants (on top of debt relief) were given to
ease the debt reduction process in highly indebted countries, a
strategy that we have defined defensive granting.
We shall also estimate extended specifications of Eqns. (9)–
(11) where long-term debt is decomposed into the shares held
by multilateral, bilateral, and private creditors. The three debt-
to-GDP ratios are entered separately in order to investigate
whether the creditor–donors’ reaction to the level of debt dif-
fers depending on its holder.
The set of variables Zit comprises other determinants of loan
and grant allocation related to poverty reduction and aid effec-
tiveness that are standard in the empirical literature on aid
allocation. We include the real per-capita GDP at PPP to ac-
count for poverty reduction; the World Bank’s Country Policy
and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index 12 which reflects
the Bank’s internal evaluation of the countries’ quality of pol-
icy and institutions that increases aid effectiveness; and popu-
lation. We also include the growth rate of real GDP to correct
for cyclical fluctuations affecting the funding needs of recipient
countries. The growth rate of GDP is taken as a simple proxy
for the output gap, which is the variable suggested by Bohn
(1998) and Mendoza and Ostry (2008). We shall use an esti-
mate of the output gap in the sensitivity analysis.
All variables in Zit are lagged by 1 year since their contem-
poraneous values are not available to creditor–donors at the
time when resources are allocated. The use of lagged variables
also reduces potential endogeneity problems. Data on real per-
capita GDP at PPP, real GDP growth and population come
from the Penn World Table (2009). Further details on variable
definitions, data sources, and some descriptive statistics are re-
ported in Table 7 of the Appendix.
Since the CPIA index does not exhaust the list of variables
that possibly capture the quality of policies and institutions,
we have considered the rate of growth of government spend-
ing, the rate of inflation and openness (exports plus imports
as a share of GDP) as other possible measures of policy per-
formance. While these additional variables were not significant
at conventional levels, our main results were not affected by
their inclusion (either including or excluding the CPIA index).
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rule of law
was also investigated but was not found to be significant.
While some multilateral agencies, such as the IDA window
of the World Bank, explicitly follow allocation rules that take
into account poverty and policy performance, other factors
such as former colonial status, commercial ties, or geopolitical
considerations may influence aid allocation in the case of bilat-
eral donors, as documented in the literature. To the extent that
such factors are not varying over time, their impact on
resource allocation is controlled by country fixed effects, ai;
but the effects of colonial and commercial ties that link
individual donors to recipient countries, cannot be explicitly
estimated because multilateral and bilateral donors are
aggregated into two groups.Please cite this article in press as: Marchesi, S., & Missale, A. DidHi
World Development (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012(a) The estimation method
The full dataset is a panel of IDA and IDA-blend countries
with 1747 observations for the period from 1982 to 2008. The
panel is almost balanced due to missing data for transition
economies in the 1980s. Since we consider only two large
groups of creditor–donors, there are no cases of IDA countries
not receiving any net loans or grants and standard fixed-effects
estimation methods can be applied.
The basic models derived in Section 3 do not account for the
fact that aid is typically planned in the context of multiyear
plans and is disbursed into a number of installments over time.
In fact, simple inspection reveals the presence of a significant
autocorrelation in our dependent variables. Then, to account
for the persistent nature of net loans, net transfers and grants,
we also estimate a dynamic specification of models (9)–(11) by
including the first lag of the dependent variable among the
regressors. The dynamic models allow us to correctly estimate
the effect of the debt-to-GDP ratio; that is, to avoid the omit-
ted variable bias that would arise from the exclusion of the
lagged dependent variables. 13
We use a fixed-effects GLS estimator in order to correct for
heteroskedasticity across countries and obtain efficient esti-
mates. A groupwise likelihood ratio heteroskedasticity test,
performed on the residuals of the baseline model estimated
by OLS, led to a rejection of the null hypothesis of homoske-
dasticity across groups (countries) for all regressions. We also
tested for serial correlation of the error terms within groups
using the LM test suggested by Baltagi and Li (1995). Under
two alternative assumptions for the error autocorrelation
structure (i.e., an AR(1) and a MA(1)) the null hypothesis of
no serial correlation in the disturbance is rejected in one equa-
tion out of four. Since the size of the autocorrelation coeffi-
cient is negligible for all equations, we decided not to correct
for serial correlation and to adopt a feasible fixed-effects
GLS estimator, incorporating only heteroskedasticity across
countries.
In a dynamic panel with country fixed effects the lagged
dependent variable is correlated with the country-specific com-
ponent of the error term and, thus, the GLS fixed-effects esti-
mator produces biased estimates. However, Nickell (1981)
shows that, in the AR(1) case, the bias declines as the time ser-
ies dimension of the panel, T, increases. Judson and Owen
(1999) test the performance of the fixed-effects estimator by
means of Monte Carlo simulations, concentrating on panels
with typical macroeconomic dimensions, that is, small N and
T. Their analysis suggests that the fixed-effects estimator per-
forms well when T = 30. As in our sample T = 27, we expect
any bias introduced by the inclusion of the lagged dependent
variable to be small. However, we also provide estimates using
the difference GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and
Bond (1991), treating the debt-to-GDP ratio and the other
regressors as predetermined variables. The Arellano and Bond
estimator uses the lags of the levels of the endogenous and pre-
determined variables as instruments, and is preferable, in our
case, to system GMM (Blundell & Bond, 1998), since net
loans, net transfers, and grants are not strongly autocorrelat-
ed, that is, they are far from random walks, which implies that
the lagged levels are good instruments for the first-differenced
variables. In particular, the set of instruments includes six suit-
able lags of the dependent variable and the predetermined
variables; that is, from lag t  2 to t  7 of Lt (or NTt, Gt),
and from lag t  1 to t  6 of Bt and Zt. We limit the number
of lags used as instruments to avoid the weak-instrument
problem that arises because of the excessive number of instru-
ments in our sample where T = 27 (see, e.g., Roodman, 2009).gh Debts Distort Loan and Grant Allocation to IDA Countries?,
.12.011
Table 1. Multilateral and bilateral net loans – 1982–2008
GLS, static panels GLS, dynamic panels Difference GMM
Multilateral
net loans
Bilateral net
loans
Multilateral
net loans
Bilateral
net loans
Multilateral
net loans
Bilateral
net loans
Multilateral
net loans
Bilateral
net loans
Multilateral
net loans
Bilateral
net loans
Total debt 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.005**
(3.272) (4.048) (2.656) (3.824) (2.008) (2.439)
Multilateral debt 0.009*** 0.001 0.008** 0.002
(3.931) (0.401) (2.292) (0.594)
Bilateral debt 0.002** 0.009*** 0.002 0.013***
(1.997) (6.050) (0.381) (4.368)
Private debt 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.007 0.011**
(2.890) (4.297) (1.370) (1.994)
Growth 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.020 0.005 0.019
(1.181) (0.988) (1.033) (0.885) (1.377) (0.998) (0.735) (1.444) (0.679) (1.289)
GDP per capita 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000
(1.613) (0.744) (0.571) (0.455) (0.766) (0.804) (0.916) (0.149) (1.430) (0.319)
CPIA 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001* 0.003*** 0.001** 0.004** 0.009 0.005*** 0.008
(9.944) (3.030) (5.159) (1.854) (4.693) (2.005) (2.282) (1.527) (2.842) (1.624)
Population 0.061*** 0.049** 0.039*** 0.012 0.035** 0.018 0.093*** 0.025 0.088*** 0.046
(3.302) (2.325) (2.779) (1.176) (2.458) (1.570) (2.818) (0.768) (2.820) (1.095)
Dependent var. (t  1) 0.434*** 0.491*** 0.438*** 0.479*** 0.361*** 0.483*** 0.356*** 0.502***
(20.674) (23.056) (20.674) (22.619) (6.210) (15.236) (6.118) (13.857)
Observations 1747 1747 1747 1747 1747 1747 1672 1672 1672 1672
No. of countries 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
AR(2) P-value 0.1279 0.4004 0.1289 0.4044
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects and time dummies. z statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 2. Multilateral and bilateral net transfers – 1982–2008
GLS, static panel GLS, dynamic panels Difference GMM
Multilateral
net transfers
Bilateral
net transfers
Multilateral
net transfers
Bilateral net
transfers
Multilateral
net transfers
Bilateral
net transfers
Multilateral
net transfers
Bilateral
net transfers
Multilateral
net transfers
Bilateral
net transfers
Total debt 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.004
(5.245) (6.334) (1.543) (0.258) (0.911) (0.875)
Multilateral debt 0.001 0.011*** 0.022 0.020**
(0.154) (3.418) (1.277) (2.298)
Bilateral debt 0.002 0.006*** 0.004 0.006
(1.256) (2.785) (0.839) (1.152)
Private debt 0.008*** 0.002 0.008 0.005
(3.311) (0.376) (1.302) (0.606)
Growth 0.013** 0.012 0.014** 0.004 0.013** 0.005 0.049** 0.039** 0.046*** 0.040**
(1.990) (1.565) (2.374) (0.681) (2.270) (0.739) (2.349) (2.281) (2.584) (2.448)
GDP per capita 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.006** 0.002 0.004** 0.000
(5.687) (4.377) (3.209) (2.429) (3.117) (2.194) (2.532) (1.110) (2.521) (0.168)
CPIA 0.006*** 0.002* 0.002** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001 0.005* 0.007 0.005* 0.005
(6.209) (1.820) (2.368) (0.246) (2.616) (0.532) (1.787) (1.190) (1.844) (1.044)
Population 0.049* 0.225*** 0.023 0.062** 0.023 0.076** 0.119* 0.161 0.120 0.169
(1.837) (4.268) (1.052) (1.996) (0.942) (2.229) (1.655) (1.355) (1.613) (1.422)
Dependent var. (t  1) 0.472*** 0.587*** 0.466*** 0.581*** 0.320*** 0.560*** 0.335*** 0.580***
(22.199) (29.820) (21.152) (29.234) (3.104) (18.335) (2.686) (15.600)
Observations 1745 1747 1745 1747 1745 1747 1670 1672 1670 1672
No. of countries 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
AR(2) P-value 0.1571 0.498 0.1342 0.5288
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects and time dummies. z statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 3. Multilateral and bilateral grants – 1982–2008
GLS, static panel GLS, dynamic panels Difference GMM
Multilateral
grants
Bilateral
grants
Multilateral
grants
Bilateral
grants
Multilateral
grants
Bilateral
grants
Multilateral
grants
Bilateral
grants
Multilateral
grants
Bilateral
grants
Total debt 0.006*** 0.014*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.009 0.012***
(6.969) (12.275) (2.931) (2.588) (1.378) (2.825)
Multilateral debt 0.006*** 0.006** 0.032** 0.020*
(3.350) (2.221) (1.993) (1.946)
Bilateral debt 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.010
(0.400) (1.494) (0.042) (1.490)
Private debt 0.003*** 0.000 0.001 0.006
(2.629) (0.159) (0.368) (0.472)
Growth 0.007* 0.003 0.008** 0.007 0.008** 0.008* 0.051* 0.026** 0.047* 0.025**
(1.745) (0.450) (2.402) (1.620) (2.571) (1.714) (1.830) (2.545) (1.934) (2.501)
GDP per capita 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.005** 0.003* 0.003** 0.002
(7.863) (5.671) (3.925) (2.042) (3.731) (1.715) (2.393) (1.716) (2.421) (0.990)
CPIA 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.433) (1.116) (0.748) (0.131) (1.055) (0.142) (0.162) (1.108) (0.558) (0.737)
Population 0.020 0.097** 0.014 0.031 0.009 0.038 0.019 0.143 0.032 0.118
(1.215) (2.533) (1.089) (1.265) (0.541) (1.470) (0.487) (1.336) (0.659) (1.354)
Dependent var. (t  1) 0.519*** 0.649*** 0.501*** 0.646*** 0.272** 0.520*** 0.241 0.514***
(20.683) (33.856) (19.373) (33.133) (2.436) (16.980) (1.634) (18.085)
Observations 1746 1748 1746 1748 1746 1748 1671 1673 1671 1673
No. of countries 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
AR(2) P-value 0.3058 0.1716 0.2443 0.1916
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects and time dummies. z statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 4. Resource allocation: HIPCs versus nonHIPCs – 1982–2008
GLS, dynamic panels
Multilateral
net loans
Bilateral
net loans
Multilateral
net transfers
Bilateral
net transfers
Multilateral
grants
Bilateral
grants
Multilateral
net loans
Bilateral
net loans
Multilateral
net transfers
Bilateral
net transfers
Multilateral
grants
Bilateral
grants
H  Total debt 0.002** 0.003*** 0.002* 0.001 0.002*** 0.003***
(2.329) (4.010) (1.658) (0.429) (2.716) (3.152)
NH  Total debt 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.008** 0.001 0.003
(1.356) (0.549) (0.823) (2.293) (1.001) (1.284)
H  Multilateral debt 0.007*** 0.000 0.006 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.008***
(2.768) (0.280) (1.400) (3.718) (4.178) (3.046)
NH  Multilateral debt 0.046*** 0.002 0.044*** 0.005 0.001 0.007
(7.508) (0.423) (5.689) (0.578) (0.426) (1.327)
H  Bilateral debt 0.002** 0.009*** 0.002 0.005* 0.000 0.003*
(2.175) (5.307) (1.616) (1.913) (0.624) (1.770)
NH  Bilateral debt 0.002 0.009*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.000 0.003
(0.901) (2.973) (0.443) (2.798) (0.127) (1.151)
H  Private debt 0.000 0.007** 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.004
(0.186) (2.171) (1.571) (1.088) (1.559) (1.181)
NH  Private debt 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.013*** 0.006 0.004** 0.005
(4.854) (2.762) (4.096) (0.835) (2.398) (1.007)
Growth 0.004 0.003 0.013** 0.005 0.008** 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.014** 0.005 0.009*** 0.006
(1.026) (0.909) (2.276) (0.713) (2.546) (1.611) (0.920) (1.037) (2.303) (0.757) (2.671) (1.441)
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001*** 0.001**
(0.579) (0.395) (3.046) (2.445) (4.081) (2.098) (0.857) (0.854) (3.066) (2.316) (3.896) (2.135)
CPIA 0.003*** 0.001* 0.002** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003*** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.001 0.000 0.000
(5.136) (1.840) (2.372) (0.260) (0.943) (0.049) (5.135) (1.966) (3.194) (0.610) (1.113) (0.070)
Population 0.039*** 0.013 0.018 0.051* 0.016 0.024 0.027* 0.017 0.014 0.082** 0.010 0.044
(2.704) (1.326) (0.874) (1.705) (1.276) (1.009) (1.777) (1.517) (0.546) (2.294) (0.639) (1.593)
Dependent var. (t  1) 0.435*** 0.490*** 0.472*** 0.584*** 0.520*** 0.645*** 0.438*** 0.477*** 0.458*** 0.575*** 0.488*** 0.636***
(20.646) (22.993) (22.229) (29.610) (20.847) (33.531) (20.979) (22.453) (20.918) (28.901) (18.832) (32.333)
Observations 1747 1747 1745 1747 1746 1748 1747 1747 1745 1747 1746 1748
No. of countries 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects and time dummies. z statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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(a) Multilateral and bilateral net loans
The results of the estimation of multilateral and bilateral net
loans are presented in Table 1. Columns 1 and 2 report results
for the static specification in Eqn. (9), while columns 3 and 4
for the dynamic specification of the same equation that in-
cludes the first lag of the dependent variable.
Both the static and the dynamic versions show a signifi-
cant negative reaction of net loans to the debt ratio, both
in the case of multilateral and bilateral creditors. In the dy-
namic specification the contraction of net loans reduces debt
accumulation in the short run by 0.2% in the case of mul-
tilateral creditors and by 0.3% in the case of bilateral cred-
itors, while the estimated impact on debt accumulation in
the long run is about 0.4% (=0.02/(1  0.43)) and 0.6%
(=0.03/(1  0.49)), respectively. Although the magnitude
of this reaction is weaker than usually found for advanced
and emerging economies, 14 it is still consistent with a stable
dynamics of the debt ratio, once we consider the highly con-
cessional terms of IDA countries’ debt and nominal GDP
growth. 15
The highly significant coefficient on previous-year net loans
clearly points in favor of the dynamic model, but raises an
endogeneity issue in that the lagged dependent variable could
be correlated with the fixed-effect component of the error
term. However, as shown in columns 7 and 8, the difference
GMM estimator yields very similar results. If anything, the ef-
fect of the debt ratio on net loans is stronger, though less sig-
nificant, for both groups of creditors.
Hence, official creditors reduced their exposure to IDA
country debt, though at a slow pace, decreasing their loans
to such countries as their debt increased. Indeed, we find no
evidence of Ponzi-scheme financing. The hypothesis of
defensive lending, that q P 0, is strongly rejected for both
specifications and estimation methods. This result is in line
with the findings of Geginat and Kraay (2007) for IDA
lending and in sharp contrast with the literature on defen-
sive lending.
To gain further insight in the lenders’ decision, we decom-
pose the stock of debt into the shares held by multilateral,
bilateral, and private creditors and enter the three debt ratios
in the dynamic regression separately. The results of this inves-
tigation are reported in columns 5–6 and 9–10 for the GLS
and GMM estimations, respectively. Interestingly, each credi-
tor group reacts more strongly to the debt share it holds than
to the share of debt held by the other group. This finding is
consistent with the creditors’ aim to reduce loans where they
were more exposed which is clear evidence against the defen-
sive lending hypothesis.
While multilateral and bilateral creditors show the same
reaction to the debt ratio, only the former takes into ac-
count the policy performance of recipient countries, as mea-
sured by the CPIA index. The greater selectivity of
multilateral organizations in deciding on loan allocation is
shown by the positive coefficient on the CPIA index that
is significant at the 1% level in all regressions. By contrast,
a higher CPIA score lowers net loans from bilateral credi-
tors, though such effect is not significant in GMM estima-
tion. On the other hand, real GDP per capita at PPP,
and thus relative poverty, does not appear to play a role
in loan allocation, nor does GDP growth, which is perhaps
surprising in the case of multilateral organizations. Finally,
IDA countries with large populations receive more loans
from multilateral creditors.Please cite this article in press as: Marchesi, S., & Missale, A. DidHi
World Development (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012(b) Multilateral and bilateral net transfers
Having provided evidence of a systematic negative reaction
of net loans to debt, it is interesting to investigate whether this
reaction forced debtor countries to correct trade deficits (and
attract foreign direct investment) or lower loans were accom-
modated through the transfers of other resources. Evidence
on the allocation of net transfers is reported in Table 2 for
the static model of Eqn. (10) in columns 1 and 2, and for its
dynamic version in the columns that follow.
The static model estimation shows that net transfers pro-
vided by either multilateral or bilateral donors increased with
the debt ratio. However, the positive and significant coefficient
on the debt ratio in the static specification is likely due to an
omitted variable problem, as the first lag of net transfers is
highly significant when it is added to the regressions in columns
3 and 4. After controlling for their persistence, net transfers dis-
play no reaction to the debt ratio, either in the GLS or GMM
estimations reported in columns 3–4 and 7–8, respectively. In
all cases, it appears that the resources provided by multilateral
and bilateral creditor–donors allowed IDA countries to avoid a
reduction of the trade deficit as the debt increased. Indeed, the
hypothesis of “unreactive transfers,” that k P 0, cannot be re-
jected at any reasonable significance level.
Further details on official donors’ allocation of net transfers
are provided in columns 5–6 and 9–10 where the shares of debts
held by multilateral, bilateral, and private creditors enter the
regressions separately. While multilateral net transfers are
unaffected by the type of debt holder (the positive correlation
with private debt disappears in GMM estimation), bilateral
transfers are positively correlated with the share of debt that
IDA countries owe to multilateral creditors, a fact already ob-
served by Birdsall et al. (2003) for the period from 1978 to 1998.
The estimation results also show an important role for pov-
erty reduction in the decision of official creditor–donors on
allocating net transfers, contrary to what has been found in
the case of net loans. In fact, the coefficient on real GDP
per capita is negative and significant in all but one regression
of Table 2. Furthermore, multilateral donors clearly accom-
modated cyclical downturns, as their transfers significantly de-
crease with GDP growth, and a similar effect is observed for
bilateral transfers but only in GMM estimation. Finally, evi-
dence for the CPIA index confirms the selectivity of multilat-
eral organizations (as opposed to bilateral donors) in
allocating their resources to IDA countries with better policies
and institutions, a result that is often found in the empirical
literature on aid (e.g., Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Collier & Dol-
lar, 2002).
Summing up, the analysis suggests that both multilateral
and bilateral donors provided more grants to highly indebted
countries, while reducing net loans, in an attempt to soften
their budget constraints. While the substitution of grants for
loans is well established in the new aid architecture (e.g., Bu-
low & Rogoff, 2005; Cohen et al., 2007; Johansson, 2010;
Radelet, 2005), this substitution appears to have provided offi-
cial donors with an exit strategy from high levels of debt in
addition to debt relief. This hypothesis is investigated in the
next section.
(c) Multilateral and bilateral grants
The relation between grants and debt may shed light on
whether grants were given to IDA countries to ease their debt
adjustment process. Table 3 shows evidence on grant alloca-
tion for the static and dynamic specifications of Eqn. (11)
and for GLS and GMM estimation methods.gh Debts Distort Loan and Grant Allocation to IDA Countries?,
.12.011
Table 5. Resource allocation: HIPCs versus nonHIPCs – different periods: 1982–99 and 1999–2008
GLS, dynamic panels
1982–99 1999–2008
Multilateral
net loans
Bilateral
net loans
Multilateral
net transfers
Bilateral
net transfers
Multilateral
grants
Bilateral
grants
Multilateral
net loans
Bilateral
net loans
Multilateral
net transfers
Bilateral
net transfers
Multilateral
grants
Bilateral
grants
H  Total debt 0.002** 0.003*** 0.004* 0.003 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.006** 0.000 0.003** 0.002
(2.178) (3.101) (1.834) (1.559) (2.838) (3.910) (0.297) (3.202) (2.417) (0.168) (2.245) (1.386)
NH  Total debt 0.004* 0.002 0.005* 0.012** 0.001 0.005* 0.003 0.000 0.006** 0.009** 0.004*** 0.009***
(1.670) (0.652) (1.749) (2.543) (1.066) (1.858) (1.013) (0.077) (1.984) (2.392) (2.852) (3.837)
Growth 0.006 0.005 0.017** 0.019** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.003 0.005* 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.003
(1.171) (1.150) (2.330) (2.132) (3.762) (3.519) (0.527) (1.701) (1.029) (0.912) (0.642) (0.679)
GDP per capita 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003** 0.001* 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(1.487) (0.752) (1.481) (2.014) (1.756) (1.320) (0.163) (0.259) (2.637) (3.049) (3.216) (2.730)
CPIA 0.003*** 0.001* 0.002* 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.003* 0.000 0.002**
(4.127) (1.937) (1.941) (0.959) (0.783) (0.482) (1.544) (0.064) (0.314) (1.838) (0.230) (2.272)
Population 0.065* 0.116*** 0.049 0.225*** 0.013 0.052 0.067** 0.003 0.022 0.004 0.028** 0.004
(1.882) (2.579) (0.741) (2.874) (0.336) (0.959) (2.249) (0.243) (0.752) (0.212) (2.051) (0.246)
Dependent var. (t  1) 0.382*** 0.458*** 0.391*** 0.478*** 0.369*** 0.518*** 0.312*** 0.327*** 0.358*** 0.384*** 0.416*** 0.470***
(14.201) (16.834) (13.974) (17.439) (10.581) (18.940) (8.993) (8.679) (10.540) (11.030) (11.128) (13.583)
Observations 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096 724 724 722 724 723 725
No. of countries 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects and time dummies. z statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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12 January 2013Both multilateral and bilateral grants increase with the debt
ratio independently of whether a static or dynamic model is
estimated. Evidence of a positive effect of the debt ratio on
grants is strong in the case of bilateral donors, as the debt
coefficient is significant at the 1% level in all regressions (see
columns 2, 4 and 6). In the case of multilateral donors, the
debt ratio significantly increases grants at the 1% level in
GLS estimates while it is not significant in GMM estimates,
though with a p-value of 15%, (see column 7). The mixed re-
sults for multilateral grants can however be explained by look-
ing at the regressions in columns 5 and 9 where the debt shares
held by multilateral, bilateral, and private creditors are entered
separately. Both GLS and GMM estimations show that mul-
tilateral debt was a main determinant of multilateral grants, as
opposed to bilateral debt and, to a lesser extent, private debt.
When this result is matched with previous evidence of a nega-
tive reaction of multilateral loans to multilateral debt (see col-
umns 5 and 9 in Table 1), it lends further support to the
conjecture that grants were substituted for loans as a part of
the exit strategy of multilateral organizations from IDA coun-
tries’ debt problems. Finally, columns 6 and 10 show that
bilateral donors also provided more grants to countries with
high multilateral debt, a finding that likely reflects their greater
involvement in debt relief initiatives until the mid-2000s.
While indebtedness was a main determinant of grant alloca-
tion, official donors were not insensitive to recipients’ needs.
Poverty and low growth also played a significant role in do-
nors’ decisions. The coefficient on real GDP per capita is in-
deed negative and significant in all but one regression for
bilateral grants. Multilateral donors also provided more
grants to dampen the impact of cyclical downturns, and a sim-
ilar behavior is observed for bilateral donors but only in
GMM estimation. The intervention of official donors in low-
growth environments is evidence of the importance of recipi-
ents’ needs in their aid policy. On the other hand, the policy
performance of IDA countries, as measured by the CPIA in-
dex, does not seem to be a relevant factor in grant allocation
even in the case of multilateral donors, contrary to what pre-
viously found for net loans and net transfers.
The finding of a significant positive relation between debt
and conventional grants, after controlling for poverty and
cyclical indicators, points to a distortion of aid flows in favor
of indebted countries. It suggests that grants were provided to
offset the contemporaneous reduction in net loans so as to ease
the debt adjustment process of high debt countries, a strategy
that we have called defensive granting.845
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864(d) HIPC versus nonHIPC countries
If official creditors aimed at reducing their exposure to de-
fault risk, the reaction of net loans to the debt ratio could
be stronger at higher levels of debt. Intertemporal sustainabil-
ity can indeed be ensured by a nonlinear reaction that is
strictly negative above a certain threshold debt ratio (Bohn,
1998). To capture possible nonlinearities, we distinguish be-
tween HIPC and nonHIPC countries rather than focusing
on given thresholds of the debt ratio, which would be arbitrary
and vary across countries depending on the quality of their
policies and institutions (Kraay & Nehru, 2006).
The condition of being a HIPC country is a relevant proxy
for having a high level of debt since a debt ratio exceeding a
given threshold is needed to qualify for the HIPC Initiative,
while the condition of being eligible for IDA borrowing is nat-
urally satisfied in our sample. Hence, to investigate whether a
high debt ratio changes the allocation of net loans, net trans-
fers, and grants, we allow the effect of debt on donors’ deci-Please cite this article in press as: Marchesi, S., & Missale, A. DidHi
World Development (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012sions to be different in the case of HIPC and nonHIPC
countries. We do so by interacting the debt ratio with two
dummies; a dummy Hi, taking the value of one in the case
of a HIPC country and a dummy NHi taking the value of
one in the case of a nonHIPC country. Then, we estimate
the following dynamic panel models:
Lit ¼ ai þ st þ bZit þ qHHiBit  qNHNHiBit þ mLit1 þ e ð12Þ
NT it ¼ ai þ st þ cZit þ kHHiBi;t þ kNHNHiBit þ wNT it1 þ eNTit
ð13Þ
Git ¼ ai þ st þ dZit þ lHHiBit þ lNHNHiBit þ vGit1 þ eGit ð14Þ
The coefficients on the interacted debt ratios allow us to
examine whether the effect of the debt ratio on net loans,
net transfers, and grants differs between HIPC and non-
HIPC countries.
The fixed-effects GLS estimates are shown in Table 4, and
they are robust to a GMM estimation which is reported in
Table 8 of the Appendix. Columns 1–6 present results for
the total debt ratio, while columns 7–12 for the decomposition
of the debt ratio in the shares held by multilateral, bilateral,
and private creditors. 16
Evidence of a different effect of the debt ratio on resource
allocation across HIPC and nonHIPC countries is striking.
At low levels of debt, as in the case of nonHIPC countries,
the debt ratio plays no role in the creditor–donors’ decisions
on allocating either net loans or grants. The debt ratio signif-
icantly affects only bilateral net transfers but with a negative
sign (see columns 2–6). By contrast, at high levels of debt, that
is for HIPC countries, the reaction of net loans to the debt ra-
tio is negative while grants increase. Such effects are significant
at the 1% level both in the case of multilateral and bilateral
creditor–donors. The combined effects of the debt ratio on
grants and net loans leave bilateral net transfers unaffected
and even raise multilateral net transfers, though at the 10%
significance level.
Evidence on net loans is consistent with a significant nonlin-
earity in the response of official creditors to the debt ratio; a
negative reaction emerges only at high levels of debt. The find-
ing that official creditors reduced their exposure to the high
debts of HIPC countries, while they took no action in the case
of sustainable nonHIPC debt, is further evidence against
defensive lending. On the other hand, both groups of donors
provided more grants to HIPC countries as their debt in-
creased. This was possibly to ease the debt adjustment process
(on top of debt relief) that would have otherwise required a
correction of their trade deficits or more foreign direct invest-
ments. These findings lend further support to the hypothesis of
defensive granting, that grants were used in place of loans to
solve the HIPC debt problem.
While multilateral and bilateral institutions have a similar
reaction to total debt, columns 7 and 8 show that debt own-
ership is another important determinant of their lending
decisions. While multilateral creditors reduced their loans
to HIPC countries independently of whether they or bilat-
eral creditors held the debt, bilateral creditors only reacted
to their own share of debt. The concern of official creditors
for their own exposure is also evident in the negative reac-
tion to their own share of nonHIPC debt. In fact, bilateral
creditors reduced net loans as their debt share increased,
without distinguishing between HIPC and nonHIPC coun-
tries, while multilateral lenders’ reaction to their share of
debt was even stronger in the case of nonHIPC countries.
The fact that official creditors reduced net loans to countries
where they were more exposed is inconsistent with a defen-
sive lending strategy.gh Debts Distort Loan and Grant Allocation to IDA Countries?,
.12.011
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12 January 2013The effect of debt ownership on grant allocation is shown
in columns 11 and 12. Multilateral and bilateral grants sig-
nificantly increase with the debt ratio in the case of HIPC
countries while the debt has no effect in nonHIPC countries
(except when it is owed to private creditors). The new inter-
esting result is that only the share of debt held by multilat-
eral creditors has an impact on the donors’ decision to
allocate more grants to HIPC countries. A higher share of
debt owed to multilateral organizations increases both mul-
tilateral and bilateral grants at the 1% significance level.
Interestingly, bilateral donors provide more grants when
the debt is held by multilateral creditors, but they show
no reaction to their own share of debt. A possible interpre-
tation of this result is that bilateral assistance to HIPC
countries with a high share of bilateral debt mainly took
the form of debt relief, while conventional grants were used
to ease debt consolidation in countries that were mostly in-
debted to multilateral organizations.
While we find no evidence of defensive lending, our analysis
suggests that grants were given to mitigate the impact of lower
loans and to ease the debt adjustment process of HIPC coun-
tries, a strategy that we have called defensive granting. Since
the correlation between grants and debt only emerges in the
case of HIPC countries, the hypothesis of defensive granting
offers a more convincing explanation of the positive link be-
tween grants and debt than poverty reduction and/or low
growth. In fact, even if HIPC countries were in more need
for grants than other IDA countries, the presence of GDP
per capita, GDP growth, and country-specific effects should
control for this motivation of aid. This evidence points to a
distortion of aid flows in favor of indebted countries that is
even more serious when associated to multilateral organiza-
tions which should lend and monitor the implementation of
the reforms associated with aid flows (e.g., Celasun & Ramch-
aran, 2005; Marchesi & Sabani, 2007; Ramcharan, 2003).
(e) Robustness checks
Thus far we have provided extensive evidence that the lend-
ing policy of official creditors was far from defensive through
various specifications and estimation methods. However, our
analysis is not immune from the criticism that defensive lend-
ing was a practice of the past that was clearly abandoned in
the late 1990s once official creditors moved to a debt relief
strategy. Specifically, it can be argued that our sample cannot
capture defensive lending since it covers the 2000s when sus-
tainable debt levels were achieved through debt-stock reduc-
tions. Moreover, one may think that the negative relation
between net loans and the debt ratio is spurious; that is, it is
due to the increase in net loans and the fall in debt ratios
brought about by the contemporaneous reduction in debt ser-
vice and debt stocks following debt relief.
To address such concerns and to check the robustness of
our results, we divide our sample in two periods: from
1982 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2008. The first period ends
in 1999, a year which marked the beginning of greater efforts
in debt reduction by both bilateral and multilateral lenders
with the launch of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. Evidence
from the two sub-periods also allows us to investigate: (i)
whether donors’ selectivity, with respect to poverty and/or
policy performance, has improved in the most recent period;
and (ii) whether the allocation of resources to HIPC and
nonHIPC countries has changed with a greater use of debt
relief.
The results of the estimation of models (12)–(14), which
distinguish between HIPC and nonHIPC countries, overPlease cite this article in press as: Marchesi, S., & Missale, A. DidHi
World Development (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012the two sub-periods 1982–99 and 1999–2008 are shown in
columns 1–6 and columns 7–12 of Table 5, respectively. Col-
umns 1 and 2 show a negative and significant reaction of net
loans to the debt ratio for the reduced sample period 1982–
99. Contrary to what is commonly held, there is no evidence
of defensive lending even before the implementation of the
Enhanced HIPC Initiative.
The year 1999 however marks a change in the lending pol-
icy of multilateral organizations toward HIPC countries as
multilateral loans no longer react to the debt ratio over the
most recent period (see columns 7 and 8). This finding may
reflect the new strategy of relying on debt write-offs instead
of loan reductions to ensure debt sustainability. A change
in policy is also observed for bilateral donors with respect
to their grant allocations. In the earlier period bilateral
grants significantly increase with the debt ratio of HIPC
countries. This is no longer the case in the most recent period
where a positive relation with the debt ratio of nonHIPC
countries emerges instead. A tentative explanation of this re-
sult is that, because of multilateral debt relief in the 2000s,
bilateral assistance was no longer needed to ease the debt
adjustment process in HIPC countries that were highly in-
debted to multilateral organizations.
Interestingly, the new strategy has little impact on the
relation between net transfer and debt in HIPC countries.
If anything, the positive effect of the debt ratio on multilat-
eral transfers becomes stronger and more significant for this
country group. Recalling that net transfers exclude debt for-
giveness, this suggests that debt relief did not crowd out
conventional aid to HIPC countries, as shown more rigor-
ously by Powell and Bird (2010). It is also clear that this
transfer of resources allowed IDA countries to avoid a cor-
rection of their trade deficits even during the most recent
period. The new regime also appears to considerably soften
the budget constraint of nonHIPC countries. While in the
period 1982–99 net transfers to nonHIPC countries signifi-
cantly decrease with the debt ratio, the opposite pattern is
observed for the period 1999–2008 (see columns 3–4 and
columns 9–10).
Finally, Table 5 sheds some light on whether donors’ selec-
tivity, with respect to poverty and/or policy performance, has
improved in the most recent period. The estimation results
clearly point to a greater role of poverty reduction in the
decisions of both multilateral and bilateral donors on allocat-
ing grants and net transfers. Indeed, the coefficient on real
GDP per capita becomes significant at the 1% level in all
regressions of grants and net transfers over the period
1999–2008 and it increases in size in the case of multilateral
transfers.
Evidence on the role of sound policies and good governance
in aid alllocation is instead mixed. Better policies and institu-
tions, as measured by the CPIA index, seem to exert a signif-
icant influence on bilateral grants and net transfers which was
absent in the earlier period (in line with the results of Claessens
et al., 2009). Multilateral net loans also depend positively on
the CPIA index in both periods but this effect is no longer sig-
nificant in the most recent period, though the coefficient re-
mains the same. The latter result contrasts with Dollar and
Levin (2006) who report that multilaterals began to respond
more to the quality of policies and institutions only in the late
1990s/early 2000s.
We have also checked the robustness of our results to the
use of an estimate of the output gap (instead of the growth
rate of GDP) in models (9)–(11), as suggested by Bohn
(1998) and Mendoza and Ostry (2008). Specifically, we have
decomposed the GDP series, using the Hodrick–Prescott fil-gh Debts Distort Loan and Grant Allocation to IDA Countries?,
.12.011
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12 January 2013ter, into the output gap and a nonlinear trend which was
used to normalize the debt stock and the dependent vari-
ables. The estimates obtained using the output gap yield
similar results and are presented in Table 9 of the Appen-
dix.
Finally, as a large literature documents the importance of
geopolitical considerations in the allocation of aid (especially
in the case of bilateral donors), we examined whether more
aid was allocated to countries voting in line with the United
States or with key G7 countries in the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly (UNGA). In particular, we introduced in
Eqns. (12)–(14) two dummy variables for whether a country
votes (more or less) in line with the United States and the
key G7 countries in the UNGA and also considered a dum-
my for temporary membership to United Nations Security
Council (UNSC). 17 As shown in Table 10 of the Appendix,
while voting in line with G7 countries significantly increases
multilateral grants and net transfers, voting in line with the
US and UNSC membership does not affect aid allocation.
The index of “Political Rights and Civil Liberties” (PRCL)
is also not significant. However, what is important for our
analysis is that the introduction of these controls does not
qualitatively change our results regarding the effect of the
debt ratio on aid allocation.1074
1075
1076
1077
1078
1079
1080
1081
1082
1083
1084
1085
1086
1087
1088
1089
1090
1091
1092
1093
1094
1095
1096
1097
1098
1099
1100
1101
1102
1103Q36. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have examined the allocation of net
loans, grants, and net transfers to IDA countries over the
period 1982–2008 focusing on the role of debt, and debt
sustainability, in the decisions of multilateral and bilateral
donors. Relying on Bohn’s (1998) model of intertemporal
debt sustainability, we have derived theoretical implications
for net loans and net transfers in relation to external debt
that imply no-Ponzi scheme financing and trade-deficit cor-
rection, respectively. Then, the effects of debt and other
determinants on official donors’ allocation of net loans,
transfers, and grants have been estimated for dynamic panel
data models, using both fixed-effects GLS and difference
GMM estimators.
Contrary to conventional wisdom and previous results in
the literature, we find no evidence of defensive lending. In-
deed, a significant negative reaction of net loans to the debt
ratio characterizes the decisions of both multilateral and
bilateral creditors, not only over the full sample period
but even before the start of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative.
Furthermore, this negative relation is stronger at high levels
of debt, namely for HIPC countries. This suggests that offi-
cial creditors reacted to the debt crisis of the 1980s/1990s by
reducing net loans to HIPC countries as their debt in-
creased, before and after the implementation of debt relief
strategies.
The impact of lower loans on the budget of debtor countries
was however accommodated through the transfers of other re-
sources, in the form of conventional grants, on top of debt for-
giveness. The resources provided by multilateral and bilateral
donors allowed IDA countries to avoid a correction of theirPlease cite this article in press as: Marchesi, S., & Missale, A. DidHi
World Development (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012trade deficits as the debt increased. Indeed, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that net transfers and, thus, trade deficits (net
of FDI) are insensitive to the debt ratio, except for nonHIPC
countries in the period before 1999. This suggests that official
donors substituted grants for loans so as to leave net transfers
to HIPC countries unaffected by the debt ratio as the latter in-
creased. Both multilateral and bilateral grants significantly in-
creased with the debt ratio, especially in HIPC countries. The
strong dependence of grants on the debt ratio is suggestive of
what we have called defensive granting, that is, the use of
grants by both multilateral and bilateral donors to accommo-
date the reduction in net loans and to ease the adjustment pro-
cess of debtor countries.
While the substitution of grants for loans is an established
trend of development assistance, when viewed in relation to
debt this substitution appears to have provided official donors
with an exit strategy from the IDA countries’ debt problem
along with debt relief. Further evidence on debt ownership
shows that this strategy was mostly at work for HIPC coun-
tries which owed a large share of their debts to multilateral
creditors. A possible interpretation of this result is that assis-
tance to countries with a high share of bilateral debt was
mainly provided by bilateral donors in the form of debt relief,
while conventional grants were used (by both multilateral and
bilateral donors) to ease debt consolidation in HIPC countries
that were mostly indebted to multilateral organizations. In-
deed, the link between bilateral grants and multilateral debt
disappears in the 2000s with a greater involvement of multilat-
eral organizations in debt relief efforts.
The results of our analysis clearly show that the amount of
grants that HIPC countries received (after controlling for pov-
erty and cyclical indicators, and excluding debt forgiveness)
have been influenced by their high debt levels. The dependence
of conventional grants on debt (and the irrelevance of the
CPIA index) points to a distortion of aid flows in favor of in-
debted countries and questions the efficiency and selectivity of
foreign aid.
Since grants have increased as a share of total aid that def-
initely dominate loans, donors’ selectivity in the allocation of
grants will be crucial for aid effectiveness. Greater future selec-
tivity requires that high debts do not affect donors’ decisions
on allocating conventional grants. Although the external debt
ratio in HIPC countries is now reduced to about 40% on aver-
age (thanks to the large amount of resources provided under
the HIPC and the MDRI Initiatives) such countries are still
likely to rely on domestic debt and nonconcessional borrow-
ing, which threaten the sustainability of their total debt (Ar-
none & Presbitero, 2010). As both bilateral and multilateral
grants still account for a significant fraction of resource flows
to HIPC countries each around 5% of the GDP in 2008, it is
crucial that the eventual accumulation of new debt will no
longer distort donors’ behavior.7. UNCITED REFERENCE
Powell (2003).NOTES1108
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capital flows to developing countries.2. Indeed, as emphasized by Dixit (2009), Easterly (2006, 2008), Rajan
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tions, and policies are context-specific and thus International Financialgh Debts Distort Loan and Grant Allocation to IDA Countries?,
.12.011
1111
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116
1117
1118
1119
1120
1121
1122
1123
1124
1125
1126
1127
1128
1129
1130
1131
1132
1133
1134
1135
1136
1137
1138
1139
1140
1141
1142
1143
1144
1145
1146
1147
1148
1149
1150
1151
1152
1153
1154
1155
1156
1157
1158
1159
1160
1161
1162
1163
1164
1165
1166
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172
1173
1174
1175
1176
1177
1178
1179
1180
1181
1182
1183
1184
1185
1186
1187
1188
1189
1190
1191
1192
1193
1194
1195
1196
1197
1198
DID HIGH DEBTS DISTORT LOAN AND GRANT ALLOCATION TO IDA COUNTRIES? 15
WD 2894 No. of Pages 20
12 January 2013Institutions have been urged to base their recommended policy changes on
a good understanding of the structure and properties of the recipient
country’s institutional, political, and economic context.
3. Eligibility for IDA support depends most importantly on a country’s
relative level of poverty. The latter is defined as GNI per capita that is
below an established threshold which is updated annually (US $1165 in
fiscal year 2011). The IDA-Blend category is used to classify countries that
are eligible for IDA resources on the basis of GNI per capita but also have
limited creditworthiness to borrow from IBRD.
4. See Radelet (2006) for a literature review that also covers aid
allocation.
5. Easterly (2007) instead finds no evidence of an increase in selectivity
with respect to policy and only a temporary increase in selectivity (in the
late 1990s) with respect to corruption.
6. See Powell and Bird (2010) for a review of the literature on the relation
between aid and debt.
7. The idea is that a creditor may want to extend new loans to enable the
borrower to repay the existing ones and avoid default, if the creditor
expects a future improvement in the borrower’s capacity to pay or wants
to postpone the recording of a loss.
8. The assumptions regarding Zt and GDP, as stated in Bohn (1998), are
“technically sufficient, and much stronger than necessary.”
9. The composition of the group of HIPC countries has changed several
times since the beginning of the first Initiative in 1996 as the various debt
relief programs have evolved over time. In this paper we choose the HIPC
classification at the start of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative in 1999. Our
results are qualitatively similar using the classification in 2001 (see Table
6) and are available upon request.
10. The time dummies st control for cross-sectional dependence and
macroeconomic factors, such as changes in the total amount of available
resources for development assistance.Please cite this article in press as: Marchesi, S., & Missale, A. DidHi
World Development (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.201211. Country programmable aid is defined as total net Official Develop-
ment Assistance less debt relief, technical assistance, humanitarian and
food aid, and debt service payments made to creditors.
12. The Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)
assesses the conduciveness of a country’s policy and institutional
framework to poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and the effective
use of development assistance. The CPIA’s 16 criteria are grouped into
four clusters that are equally weighted to derive the overall CPIA rating,
including: economic management; structural policies; policies for social
inclusion and equity; and public sector management and institutions.
13. Controlling for the lagged value of loans also removes the correlation
between current loans and previous period debt that arises if loans are
autocorrelated, because previous period loans accumulate into the stock of
debt.
14. Mendoza and Ostry (2008) find a response of the primary surplus to
the debt ratio that implies a 2% correction of the growth rate of the debt
ratio in industrial countries and a 3.6% correction in the case of emerging
economies. However, these stronger responses have to be compared to the
greater market return on debt of the latter countries.
15. For instance, IDA loans have a 10-year grace period and are
provided at a mere 0.75% service charge.
16. As the effects of the other determinants of resource allocation are
qualitatively similar to those discussed in the previous sections, here we
just focus on the effects of the debt ratio.
17. Barro and Lee (2005) find that IMF loans tend to be more frequent
and larger when a country is more connected politically and economically
to the United States and major European countries. Kuziemko and
Werker (2006) find that countries serving on the UNSC receive more
United Nations Development Project support and direct foreign aid from
the United States. Dreher et al. (2009a, 2009b) report the same for the
IMF and for the World Bank.REFERENCES1199
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Mozambique Somalia
Myanmar Sudan
Nicaragua Tanzania
Niger Togo
Rwanda Uganda
Sao Tome & Principe Vietnama
Senegal Yemen, Rep.a
Sierra Leone Zambia
Nepal St. Lucia
Nigeria St. Vincent & Grens
ublic Pakistan Tajikistan
Papua New Guinea Tonga
Samoa Uzbekistan
Solomon Islands Vanuatu
Sri Lanka Zimbabwe
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Table 7. Variables definition, summary statistics and data sources
Variable Mean SD Definition Source
Multilateral net loans 0.02 0.03 Multilateral long-term loans minus debt service (to GDP) GDF (World Bank)
– including purchases less repurchases from IMF
Bilateral net loans 0.01 0.03 Bilateral long-term loans minus debt service (to GDP) GDF (World Bank)
Multilateral grants 0.02 0.03 Multilateral grants (to GDP) DAC (OECD)
– excluding technical cooperation and debt forgiven
Bilateral grants 0.04 0.05 Bilateral grants (to GDP) DAC (OECD)
– excluding technical cooperation and debt forgiven
Multilateral debt 0.4 0.42 Long-term debt held by multilateral creditors (to GDP) GDF (World Bank)
– including debt owed to the IMF
Bilateral debt 0.35 0.48 Long-term debt held by bilateral creditors (to GDP) GDF (World Bank)
Private debt 0.12 0.21 Long-term debt held by private creditors (to GDP) GDF (World Bank)
GDP growth 0.04 0.08 Annual growth rate of GDP in constant LCU Penn World Table 6.3
GDP per capita 2.42 1.97 Constant price GDP at PPP divided by population Penn World Table 6.3
CPIA 2.94 0.72 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (Index) World Bank
Population 0.02 0.10 Population (billion units) Penn World Table 6.3
Notes: Ratios to GDP are obtained using current GDP in US dollars from WDI (World Bank).
Table 8. Resource allocation: HIPCs versus nonHIPCs – 1982–2008
Difference GMM, dynamic panels
Multilateral
net loans
Bilateral
net loans
Multilateral
net transfers
Bilateral
net transfers
Multilateral
grants
Bilateral
grants
Multilateral
net loans
Bilateral
net loans
Multilateral
net transfers
Bilateral
net transfers
Multilateral
grants
Bilateral
grants
H  Total debt 0.002* 0.005** 0.007 0.007 0.010 0.011***
(1.675) (2.212) (1.001) (1.277) (1.482) (2.695)
NH  Total debt 0.005 0.007* 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.002
(1.161) (1.882) (0.537) (1.249) (0.328) (0.284)
H  Multilateral debt 0.006* 0.002 0.026 0.022** 0.034** 0.019**
(1.903) (0.520) (1.491) (2.366) (2.185) (1.962)
NH  Multilateral debt 0.046*** 0.001 0.048*** 0.001 0.001 0.006
(3.348) (0.102) (2.577) (0.038) (0.141) (0.424)
H  Bilateral debt 0.002 0.012*** 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.012
(0.417) (3.569) (0.300) (0.011) (0.670) (1.561)
NH  Bilateral debt 0.001 0.014* 0.002 0.022*** 0.000 0.004
(0.155) (1.814) (0.303) (2.881) (0.149) (0.819)
H  Private debt 0.001 0.012** 0.006 0.014 0.004 0.018
(0.125) (2.120) (0.615) (0.749) (0.482) (0.983)
NH  Private debt 0.014*** 0.003 0.017*** 0.011 0.004 0.014***
(3.920) (0.560) (3.261) (1.156) (1.460) (3.679)
Growth 0.006 0.020 0.050** 0.043** 0.047* 0.025** 0.004 0.017 0.047** 0.043*** 0.045** 0.025***
(0.727) (1.438) (2.421) (2.496) (1.799) (2.528) (0.580) (1.280) (2.525) (2.645) (2.023) (2.641)
GDP per capita 0.001 0.000 0.006** 0.002 0.004** 0.003* 0.002** 0.001 0.004** 0.002 0.002** 0.002
(0.966) (0.265) (2.356) (1.160) (2.310) (1.743) (2.146) (0.756) (2.475) (0.981) (2.199) (1.162)
CPIA 0.004** 0.008 0.004 0.010* 0.002 0.003* 0.005*** 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.002
(2.135) (1.619) (1.197) (1.696) (1.132) (1.804) (3.237) (1.273) (1.550) (1.151) (1.070) (0.968)
Population 0.080*** 0.033 0.103 0.139 0.003 0.113 0.067** 0.033 0.091 0.150 0.015 0.118
(2.805) (0.871) (1.559) (1.210) (0.081) (1.232) (2.469) (0.926) (1.209) (1.271) (0.360) (1.234)
Dependent var. (t  1) 0.366*** 0.491*** 0.304*** 0.538*** 0.314*** 0.541*** 0.385*** 0.517*** 0.278** 0.536*** 0.303** 0.546***
(6.308) (14.736) (2.818) (18.930) (2.820) (19.871) (6.923) (13.276) (2.134) (15.635) (2.048) (15.932)
Observations 1672 1672 1670 1672 1671 1673 1672 1672 1670 1672 1671 1673
No. of countries 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
AR(2) P-value 0.1281 0.4019 0.1544 0.4771 0.3077 0.1648 0.1251 0.4064 0.1264 0.5082 0.2686 0.1345
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects and time dummies. z statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 9. Net loans, net transfers and grants – 1982–2008
GLS, dynamic panels with output gap
Multilateral
net loans
Bilateral
net loans
Multilateral
net transfers
Bilateral
net transfers
Multilateral
grants
Bilateral
grants
Multilateral
net loans
Bilateral
net loans
Multilateral
net transfers
Bilateral
net transfers
Multilateral
grants
Bilateral
grants
Total debt 0.002** 0.004*** 0.002 0.001 0.002*** 0.003***
(2.164) (4.279) (1.429) (0.308) (3.512) (3.234)
Multilateral debt 0.016*** 0.002 0.011** 0.009** 0.005*** 0.006**
(5.489) (1.316) (2.511) (2.323) (2.804) (2.207)
Bilateral debt 0.001 0.010*** 0.000 0.007*** 0.001 0.003**
(0.889) (6.434) (0.079) (2.613) (0.689) (2.160)
Private debt 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.002 0.003*** 0.001
(3.429) (5.303) (4.082) (0.353) (2.898) (0.450)
Output gap 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.432) (0.487) (0.131) (0.428) (0.097) (0.279) (0.580) (0.671) (0.004) (0.287) (0.101) (0.314)
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.371) (0.377) (3.806) (3.064) (5.417) (3.244) (0.990) (0.946) (3.939) (2.963) (5.447) (3.184)
CPIA 0.003*** 0.001* 0.002*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003*** 0.001** 0.002** 0.001 0.000 0.000
(4.639) (1.750) (2.632) (0.455) (0.649) (0.289) (4.471) (1.965) (2.529) (0.917) (0.901) (0.287)
Population 0.037*** 0.010 0.021 0.039 0.017 0.016 0.032*** 0.015 0.015 0.051* 0.014 0.021
(3.093) (1.272) (1.179) (1.548) (1.567) (0.799) (2.721) (1.588) (0.832) (1.785) (1.140) (0.959)
Dependent var. (t  1) 0.445*** 0.523*** 0.489*** 0.604*** 0.547*** 0.677*** 0.448*** 0.507*** 0.492*** 0.602*** 0.536*** 0.674***
(21.102) (26.110) (23.240) (32.042) (23.552) (37.557) (21.192) (25.419) (23.067) (31.864) (22.781) (36.892)
Observations 1749 1749 1747 1749 1748 1750 1749 1749 1747 1749 1748 1750
No. of countries 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects and time dummies. z statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 10. Voting variables and resource allocation – 1982–2008
GLS, dynamic panels
Multilateral
net loans
Bilateral
net loans
Multilateral
net transfers
Bilateral
net transfers
Multilateral
grants
Bilateral
grants
H  Total debt 0.001* 0.003*** 0.003* 0.001 0.002*** 0.003***
(1.678) (3.968) (1.804) (0.546) (2.748) (3.087)
NH  Total debt 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.008** 0.001 0.002
(0.869) (0.780) (0.835) (2.468) (0.846) (1.151)
Growth 0.003 0.004 0.013** 0.003 0.008** 0.007
(0.828) (1.177) (2.251) (0.444) (2.391) (1.440)
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001*** 0.001*
(0.760) (0.335) (2.985) (2.368) (3.926) (1.802)
CPIA 0.003*** 0.001* 0.002** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(4.868) (1.741) (1.986) (0.333) (1.016) (0.286)
Population 0.042*** 0.014 0.012 0.042 0.021 0.015
(2.858) (1.211) (0.566) (1.390) (1.538) (0.660)
UNSC 0.001 0.001 0.003* 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.923) (1.291) (1.700) (1.352) (0.737) (1.048)
Inline G7 0.009 0.003 0.021* 0.017 0.014** 0.010
(1.033) (0.371) (1.654) (1.295) (2.096) (1.072)
Inline US 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.000 0.004
(1.019) (0.515) (0.749) (0.822) (0.116) (0.804)
PRCL 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(1.536) (1.414) (0.351) (1.611) (0.145) (0.542)
Dependent var. (t  1) 0.432*** 0.485*** 0.470*** 0.585*** 0.514*** 0.639***
(20.424) (22.245) (22.082) (29.414) (20.152) (32.708)
Observations 1701 1701 1699 1701 1700 1702
No. of countries 73 73 73 73 73 73
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects and time dummies. z statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
DID HIGH DEBTS DISTORT LOAN AND GRANT ALLOCATION TO IDA COUNTRIES? 19
WD 2894 No. of Pages 20
12 January 2013Please cite this article in press as: Marchesi, S., & Missale, A. DidHigh Debts Distort Loan and Grant Allocation to IDA Countries?,
World Development (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.12.011
